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This thesis is an extension of a previous research 
project on the German military advisors in China during 
the 1 930's which 1 finished in the Spring of 1989. In
the process of further research, 1 have discovered some 
misconceptions I previously had of certain aspects of the 
German government? for example, the German Foreign office 
was not so much "pro-Chinese" as it was "neutral" in 
conducting its Far Eastern policy. With this updated work 
I hope to make the proper corrections and in the process, 
present a more accurate description of the German Far 
Eastern policy in that period.
I.PREFACE
II.INTRODUCTION
Germany's Far Eastern policy in the 1930's was an 
intriguing and complex system. The final years of the
Weimar Republic saw Germany begin to rebuild her interests 
she once had in China. After Hitler's ' Machtergreifung1 
in 1933, it was unclear in which direction German foreign 
policy vis-a-vis China and Japan would continue. The newly 
empowered National Socialists, in general, were in favor
of i political alliance with the internationally powerful
Japan (Nazi ideologues were attracted to powerful nations).
Vet China, with her abundance of mineral ores, figured
into Hitler's rearmament plan. This partially explains
why in the early 1930's, Hitler kept his pro-Japanese
sentiments subdued, and 'supported* those who pursued
economic and military interests in China. The "Sinophile"1
Keichswehr sponsored a barter involving German military
supplies for Chinese raw materials. Current and ex-German
army officials served in China as advisors to Chiang
Kai-shek and in the process, facilitated the trade between
the Keichswehr and the Nanking government. Meanwhile,
the German Foreign Office (WilhelmstraBe) had the difficult
task of trying to balance the pro-Chinese actions of the
Reichswehr against the pro-Japanese tendencies of the Nazis
in formulating its Far Eastern policy. While wary of
Japan's sensitivity over the German relationship with China,
the WilhelmstraBe also recognized the benefits from the
economic possibilities in China. In order to take advantage
of the "China Market", Germany had to sustain a harmonious
relationship with her. Thus, political support (from the
WilhelmstraBe) for Japan, which would antagonize China,
2was also undesirable.
Officials in the Foreign Office and in the army were 
not necessarily loyal Nazis. To Hitler, some were
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"outsiders*' (Fox, p. 3) representing the despised Weimar 
government. Hitler tended to disregard opinions from both 
branches, although his contempt for the Foreign Office 
was more obvious. As Ernst von Weizsacker, State Secretary 
from 1938-1945 (and the father of current West German 
President Richard von Weizsacker), testified at the
Nuremburg trial, "...Hitler had no great opinion of the 
Foreign Office. He preferred information from laymen to 
that obtained from us" (Fox, p.2). Relying heavily on 
the advice of 'laymen', the biggest of whom was Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, was perhaps Hitler's worst mistake. For 
it was the 'laymen* like von Ribbentrop who created much 
of the Far Eastern policies during the late thirties. 
The uncanny ability of von Ribbentrop and a few others 
to use the Fuhrer's pro-Japanese leanings to completely 
change the direction of Germany's foreign policy is one 
aspect that will be analyzed in this thesis. To accomplish 
this, I will look into why the Nazis zealously pursued 
a pro-Japanese policy and how this impeded their interests 
in China, leading to a collapse of Sir;o-German relations 
in 1938. Finally, the validity of the Nazi, foreign policy 
decisions will be examined. My goal is to show that Hitler 
would have gained more by following a neutral or a 
pro-China policy instead of allying Germany with
Japan. Assuming Japan would be friendlier towards
Germany than China was another one of Hitler's
.crucial errors. For the opposite was true. By choosing 
Japan over China, Hitler was sacrificing the existing 
relations with the latter for potentially better relations 
with the former. Had he not done that, the whole chain 
of events following in Europe and Asia may have been 
different.
III. PART ONE: OVERVIEW OF SINO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1917-33 
1 . Origins of Post WWI Sino-German Contacts
The conclusion of the first World War witnessed the
temporary fall of Germany from power. Subjugated to the
3terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost her 
colonial holdings in China and was forced to reduce the 
size of her military. However, the German army soon found 
ways to "circumvent" the Treaty’s military provisions and 
began to reorganize itself under the auspices of Colonel 
General Hans von Seeckt. First, he reduced the army by 
throwing out the "undesirables" and forming an elite group 
of "TraditionstragerVon Seeckt knew that the chief goal 
of the military was to rebuild itself for "future military 
e x p a n s i o n * nlans were made to find new sources for raw 
materials, with which German industrial firms could produce
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the weapons.
At the beginning of the 19209 s/ the Soviet Union was 
one source of mineral ores and a corresponding market for 
modern industrial materials manufactured by German concerns. 
Via the firm called the "Gesellschaft zur Forderung 
gewerblicher Unternehmungen", or "GEFU", the Reichswehr 
carried out their ‘secret’ trade relations with the Soviet 
Union, for awhile unbeknownst by the Weimar government. 
Von Seeckt saw the immediate benefits of this 'illegal' 
trade for the German economy. He also believed that the 
relations with Russia had geopolitical potential, if Russia 
were to become "a future ally" (Kirby, p.20).
The Weimar government apparently approved of this
5profitable albeit outlawed (by the Versailles Treaty) 
trade, because when it discovered the undercover operation, 
it merely subsidized the trade through a State-owned firm 
called "WIKO", short for "Wirtschaftskontor" (Kirby, p.20). 
However, having the Soviet Union as a major industrial 
trade partner turned out to be intolerable to the Nazis. 
Anticipating this, the Reichswehr sought to expand its 
relations with another vast land hungry for Western 
technology and military expertise; China.
Official Germany consistently viewed the benefits 
from relations with China from an economic point of view. 
China appeared from the beginning to be the market that
Germany needed to rebuild her economy after WWI. Hoping 
to resume favorable trade relations with China, the 
WilhelmstraBe carefully construed a policy toward China 
based upon equal status rather than the previous 
imperialistic terms, In a 1921 agreement with Peking, 
Germany relinquished her M special rights1* in China, waved 
off the Chinese indemnity payment from the Boxer Hebei Lion, 
and even reimbursed the Chinese for war costs. Consequently, 
this gave German firms a distinct edge in doing business 
with the Chinese, At home, German capitalists were persuaded 
to invest in China, In general, Germany’s export market 
in China flourished as both sides enthusiastically pursued 
economic interests!Kirby, p,24).
However, the bulk of German trade with China
immediately following WWI consisted of rifles and other 
military hardware. Provincial rulers during the "Warlord 
Period” (1916-1927)  ^ kept their cwn armies, making China 
the "world’s largest arms market ”(Kirby, p.23), Moreover,
Germany was not one of the signatories of the 1919 Arms
7Embargo agreement, which was an Allied attempt to stop
the civil strife in China by cutting off arms sales to 
that country. German firms took advantage of this and 
stepped up arms shipments to China. By the early twenties, 
Germany was one of China’s largest weapons suppliers. 
In 1925 alone, German firms' arms sales to China totaled
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RM 13 million, consisting of over half of her imports 
(Kirby, p. 25). Despite this prodigious weapons trade, 
the extent of Sino-German trade remained rather one-sided.
Due to the relatively uncertain policies of the
WilhelmstraBe, much of it had to be carried out
clandestinely. Only until the Chinese government under
Chiang Kai-shek made efforts for improved official relations 
between the two countries, did trade on both sides expand.
Chinese leaders' post-WWl endeavors to obtain official 
German support for their regimes originated as early as 
1920. It was then that the Reichswehr set a precedent 
to the military advisors' mission in China later in the 
19J0's, by sending "several former General Staff officers" 
to warlord regimes for "technical purposes". Others, not 
directly associated with the German army, soon were hired 
as military and technical specialists for regional 
commanders such as Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, and Sun Yat- 
sen (Kirby, p.26).
Among the Chinese leaders interested in stronger ties 
with Germany, Sun, the "Father of the Nationalist Party" 
(Kuomintang or KMT), was arguably the most pursuant. Sun 
had developed ties in Germany even before the end of WWt 
in 1917 when German patrons supported his plot to overthrow 
the unpopular Peking government. Although Sun sought 
financial support from all Western nations, he seemed most
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interested in aid from the Germans, He admired Germany's 
ability to successfully incorporate concepts of social 
welfare into a modernized industrial nation. Bismarck's 
leadership in this regard made Germany "the most powerful 
nation in the world"(Kirby, p,33), The Chinese leader was 
impressed by Germany's industrial and technological 
advancement, particularly in the military. After WWI , 
Germany was no longer an abhorred imperialist power in 
China. Moreover, her excess supply of military equipment 
at the end of the War needed an outlet market. China was 
this perfect, "inexhaustible" market(Kirby, p.30). Through 
trade with China, Germany would revamp her own economy 
and China would be on her way to industrialization and 
to achieving socialism.
Sun repeatedly presented details of his plan to the 
German government which responded ambiguously, and with 
good reason. Although Sun claimed to have had control 
of six main Southern provinces, German officialdom remained 
skeptical of his actual power in China(Kirby, p.35). Sun's 
enemies were numerous and formidable. Furthermore, up till 
the 1920's, his attempts at unifying China, even with 
foreign aid, had been disastrous. In view of this, the 
Reichawehr was hesitant in making major investments or 
sending advisors to Sun's Kuomintang government. There 
was also the WilhelmstraBe, which, mindful of the Versailles
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regulations, frequently warned the Rei chswehr not to make 
military and political commitments to China.
By 1923, Sun had apparently formed a stable regime 
and was on his way to legitimizing the KMT as the government 
of the land. He decided to play the H German card” once 
again by repeating his strategy of Sino-German economic 
cooperation to the Reichswehr. This time, Dr. Gustav Amann, 
a Siemens engineer alrc u jy working for Sun, acted as his 
"emissary plenipotentiary*(Kirby, p.36). Finally, in the
fall of 1924, German officers came to China and began work 
under Sun * s hire. However, just as the fruits of Sun's 
relentless efforts began to appear, they quickly wilted 
when he died in March, 1925.
Thus, Sun's attempts to obtain German recognition 
of his regime were on the whole, in terms of tangible 
results, unsuccessful. Still, what he did achieve was of 
significant importance. While failing to reach his main 
goal, Sun nevertheless laid the groundwork for further
Sino-German contacts later in the 1 930's. His idea for 
building the " infrastructure "(Kirby, p.3 2) of China's
economy via capital investment from abroad was sound, but 
quite unrealistic during his lifetime. His country lacked 
unity, which could only be achieved later by his disciple 
Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's Nationalist government, known 
as the Nanking regime, continued to strive for Sun's goals
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of the modernization of China. Like many in the KMT, Chiang 
adopted Sun's positive views toward the German culture, 
industry, and military status. Understandably, when 
circumstances arose in China which prompted Chiang to seek 
a source of military and economic assistance, he favored 
Germany over other nations.
2. The Military Advisors' Mission in China
Chiang Kai-shek rose to power in China in 1 926 after 
a bitter struggle for Sun Yat-nen's succession within the 
KMT. Chiang's next task was to unity China under a central 
government. The two-year campaign to defeat the powerful 
provincial warlords became known as the Northern Expedition. 
Before undertaking this reunification mission, the 
Generalissimo knew that he needed arms and advisors for 
his ill-equipped and inexperienced soldiers. Chiang looked 
to Germany for assistance. Unlike Sun, Chiang had better 
luck in engaging German officials. One reason was that 
he had more dedicated followers. Among these men in the 
KMT was Chu Chia-hua, an energetic German scholar at Sun 
Yat-sen University, who used his connections in German 
circles to help Chiang get in contact with top Reichswehr 
officers. Chu first reached General Erich Ludendorff and 
offered him the position of "senior military advisor".
Upon Ludendorff's refusal* Ch j approached the newly retired 
Generals Hans von Seeckt and Georg Wetzel1 with a similar 
offer, but both at that time, declined (Kirby, p.40). 
Finally, Chu came across Colonel Max Bauer, a longtime 
associate of Ludendorff, who became Chiang's first Chief 
military advisor. As Bauer prepared to travel to China, 
it became unclear who was actually the Colonel's employer.
In Adolf Vogt's version, the Colonel was approached
g
in Germany by a study group representing the Canton regime 
to help in the development of the South China region. 
Bauer agreed to go to China, The local Cantonese government 
at that time, in the summer of 1927, was headed by General
Li Chi-sen, who was also a de jure part of the KMT. Then
come the conflicting reports. According to Vogt, Bauer's 
original obligation was to Li and only after the latter's 
removal from power by another general, did the Colonel 
become an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. However, 
Dr. Kirby's account of Bauer's hiring is more substantive 
and probably explains how Bauer seems to have been recruited 
by 'two' leaders. Canton had been the location of the 
central KMT government before Chiang and "the victorious 
right wing" of the KMT won control of the party and moved
to Nanking. Li Chi-sen was 'left behind' to govern Canton.
During this period, the political situation in China was 
rather unstable and local governments were often ephemeral.
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Such was the case here, as Li was defeated by another 
militarist but not Chiang Kai-shek himself. This clarifies 
how Li, with Chu, was later able to introduce Bauer to 
Chiang, The trouble with the local Canton government would 
show itself in a later chapter with the Kiein-HAPRO deal.
The idea to contact Bauer was not Li's, but Chu * s,
i
Kirby portrays Chu as a protege of the ''Western Hills" 
faction, a right-wing group of the KMT, with which Chiang 
Kai-shek supposedly had close relations, Chu's decision 
to contact Bauer was influenced by Tai Chi-tao and Chang 
Jen-chieh, two Western Hills stalwarts. Tai apparently 
persuaded General Li to hire Bauer, not necessarily for 
Canton alone, rather "for the entire national army"-in 
short, for Chiang Kai-shek(Kirby, p.41), Bauer * s arrival
in Nanking in the winter of 1 927 , signaled the start of 
the German military advisor mission, which formed a basis 
for the future rapprochement between Germany and China*
In Bauer, the Nationalists had the 'perfect* man for 
overhauling the Chinese military. He was qualified in 
terms of military experience; having solved, virtually 
singlehandedly, Germany's munitions shortage problem during
QWWI as a "Sektionschef", It was Bauer's close associations 
with domestic, arms-^roducing firms that allowed him to 
accomplish the feat(Martin, p*103). Important to the 
Chinese was that these connections still existed* Bauer's 
success with the Reichswehr demonstrated not only his
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talent to organize and manage ("organisatorische Begabung"j 
Martin, p.102), but also his enthusiasm and zeal. The 
energetic Bauer even presented to Chiang ideas for the 
restructuring of the Chinese military, before coining to 
China. Finally, it was Bauer's political sentiments and
idealistic world views that attracted Chiang to him and 
vice versa.
Despite being a military genius, Bauer was a political
k
failure. His contribution to the failed Nazi Kapp-Putsch 
of 1920 forced him into exile and destroyed his political 
career at home. Thus Bauer often searched for employment
abroad, trying to fulfill his political dreams elsewhere. 
What were these "political dreams"? Bauer's views were 
very similar to Chiang's; a mixture of nationalism, 
anti-1iberalism, and anti-imperial ism. Subsequent service 
with third world countries such as Turkey and the Soviet 
Union had instilled in him the notion of creating an 
"international liberation organization", a quasi-alliance 
made up of weaker, unindustrialized nations of which China 
would be one(Martin, p.97). Bauer presented these ideas
upon his meeting with Chiang in 1927 and thoroughly 
impressed the KMT leader.
Bauer began work under Chiang in January, 1928. His 
opening assignment was to travel around China, inspecting 
the military structure while assessing the country's
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economic potential* The Colonel wrote voluminous memoranda
and gave speeches to communicate his observations• In
a series of reports, Bauer called tor 1 ) improvement in
the air force, 2) establishment of military schools, i)
the creation of a separate officer candidates school, 4)
a technical weapons school, 5) a special commander staff
unit (Lehrtruppe), and 6) the purchasing of military 
10equipment*
Upon conclusion of the preliminary planning, in March 
of 1928, Bauer returned to Germany to solicit private 
investment for China* Traveling with him was a four-person 
delegation representing Nanking, Together they visited
leading industrial firms in Germany, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands, with Bauer helping the Chinese negotiate 
contracts for the delivery of military arsenal and 
industrial equipment. During his seven month stay in 
Germany, Bauer also created the '*Handelsabteilung" (a trade 
office independent of the German government; Kirby, p. 50) 
in Berlin to supervise the future hiring of advisors
and Sino-German business transactions. Before leaving 
Germany, Bauer organized the first group of advisors 
to follow him to China* He sought but received little 
support from neither the Reichswehr nor the Foreign Office* 
In the BendlerstraBe (the Reichswehr Ministry), Bauer 
thought he had former colleagues like Hans von Seeckt
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whom he could turn to. Von Seeckt, however, hud resigned 
as head of the "Truppenamt" in 1926 and the new Keichswehr 
Minister, General Wilhelm Groener, was not particularly 
fond of Bauer, The Wi1helmstrafte, meanwhile, took the 
opportunity upon Bauer's return home to denounce the 
Colonel's work in China for being illegal and against 
national interests(Kirby, p,54), however, Bauer was not
discouraged. Instead, he focused on hiring "retired 
officers" from the Reichswehr(Kirby, p.56). From that, 
Bauer was able to assemble an entourage of military and 
civilian advisors that included a doctor, a forestry expert, 
a railroad expert, and various engineers. Perhaps the most 
prominent name among them was Colonel Hermann Kriebel,
•Aa participant in the 1 92 i Hi tier-Putsch who later became 
Chiang's head military advisor.
Thus, Bauer returned to China in November 1928, having 
achieved most of his objectives despite domestic
difficulties. He had drawn the blueprints for the 
restructuring of the military and the development of China, 
Now with the presence of advisors and the support ot German 
business magnates such as Carl Duisberg (Head of l.G. Farben 
and chairman of a major German industrial association), 
Bauer could start administering his plans. The Chinese 
government made sure that the Colonel was well taken care 
of and provided Bauer with his own office, his personal
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translator (Gen. Li Nai), and a handsome salary of 1400 
Shanghai dollars (equal then, to about 3920 Reichsmarks) 
per month(Martin, p.101).
Bauer soon proved worthy of such generous treatment.
Although he displayed strategic brilliance in helping Chiang
11defeat the Kwangsi rebels , Bauer’s importance war. in 
the less dangerous role of ’’economic advisor” (Kirby, p.51), 
as he called it. In less than a year, Bauer shaped the 
Chinese army in the mold of the Reichswehr. There were 
many elements within the six main army divisions showing 
a distinctly imperial German character: the General Staff 
(Grosser Generalstab); the President's Military cabinet 
(kaiserliches Militarkabinett)j the Director-General of 
Military Training (Generalinspection der Militar-Erziehung ) *, 
and the Ministry of War (Kriegsministerium) were but the 
most visible examples(Kirby, p.58). In the process, Bauer
was hoping to centralize the military more under Chiang 
Kai-shek's command. To achieve this, Bauer trimmed the 
army of excessive troops, creating elite divisions loyal 
to Chiang out of the remaining men. Bauer foresaw the 
potential labor available * f  the demobilized troops were 
used in the execution of his modernization projects. Men 
were needed to cultivate barren land, pave streets, lay 
railroad tracks, dig canals, and build up the industrial 
sector. German industrial firms like Otto Wolff (railroad),
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Krupp (munitions)i and Vereinigte Stahlwerke (United Steel) 
naturally would play a vital role in supplying the capital, 
Bauer's plan was broad in scope and quite simple: develop 
and modernize China while helping Chiar.g unify the country.
Unfortunately, Bauer, like Sun Yat-sen, was unable
to fully realize his dreams for himself, his country or
for China, which had become a second "Vaterland" for him.
While on the mission with Chiang against the "leftist"
Wuhan government in April, 1929, the Colonel fell ill
to small pox. He died less than a month later on May 6th,
The fact that his was the only case of the illness in that
1 3area allows for speculation that he was murdered. 
Nevertheless, Bauer's death was tragic and a monumental 
turning point in Chiang's life and, as will be seen, the 
development of the German advisors' mission in China, 
Chiang knew the loss of Bauer meant the loss of China's 
(and possibly his) best friend. Yet, as hopeless as losing 
a man with the talent and ability like Bauer may be, the 
situation in certain aspects actually improved between 
Germany and China,
Following Bauer's death, the WilhelmstraBe loosened 
the political noose on the Reichswehr? in essence, giving 
it a free hand to pursue relations with the military 
advisors in China. Up until 1929, under Bauer, and even 
immediately after Bauer, under Kriebel, the advisors mission
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lacked a direct link with the German army. Only alter the 
arrival in China of Gen. Georg Wetzell, then head of the 
Truppenamt (having replaced von Seeckt), did the Reichswehr 
become more involved. From then on, for a short period, 
Sino-German relations improved dramatically. The main 
support came from within the Reichswehr but there was 
cautious support from the WilhelmstraBe. Even it began 
to see that the potential benefits from trade relations 
with China may outweigh the importance of staying on good
terms with Japan. The German military advisor group in
China flourished. Under Wetzell, the group increased to
over 70, covering all branches of the military. With
Wetzell, the air defense aspects of Bauer's plans were
mostly ignored in favor of the infantry. Nevertheless,
German investments into China increased. Wetzell was an
excellent military man but he had an obstinate
1 4personality. As a result, after only three years of 
service (1930-33), he was replaced by Hans von Seeckt, 
who was more diplomatic in relating with Chiang. It was 
during these years, from 1933-1938, that German foreign 
policy in the Far East became more and more dualistic.
For as Sino-German ties intensified, pro-Japanese party 
loyalists began to exert influence, asserting their own
style of foreign diplomacy. Their efforts led to the 
polarization of the Far Eastern policy which ultimately
resulted in Germany's alliance with Japan.
p. 19
IV. PART TWO: DILEMMA IN THE FAR EAST, 1933-38
From 1933 co 1938, Germany’s Far Eastern policy 
indicated an attempt to maintain the delicate balance 
between the economic interests in China and the political 
interests in Japan. While the Foreign Office
(Wilhelmstrafle) did its best to remain 'neutral', to avoid 
intensifying political relations with Japan since it may 
damage existing economic ties in China, the Nazis (with 
implied consent from Hitler) were determined to improve 
German-Japanese relations in order to counter the seemingly 
’pro-Chinese' mentality of the Foreign Office.
1 , Origins of Post WWI German-Japanese Contact
Besides the conclusion of an occasional trade or 
military agreement, German-Japanese relations during the 
Weimar period was rather negligible. The WilhelmstraSe 
generally carried out an impartial Far Eastern policy in 
order to 'keep the door open' for what appeared to be 
political advantages with Japan and economical privileges 
in China. Thus, the Wilhelmstrafie*s response to the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, was to remain
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’neutral* in the Far East, to cooperate fully Mwith the 
due processes of the League (of Nations)**. The main concern 
for the WilhelmstraSe was to avoid overtly anti-Japanese 
gestures but at the same time, assure the Chinese that 
it was not pro-Japanese either. Although certain elements 
(i.e. the Social Democratic Party) in Germany condemned 
the Japanese invasion(Fox, p.22), and the German press 
apparently also sided with the Chinese, official Germany 
made no accusation of Japanese wrongdoing in Asia.
The Nanking government remained unconvinced of Germany’s 
neutral stance. To the Chinese, not condemning Japan’s 
aggression in Northern China implied a sanction for it. 
Chinese officials tried and failed to gain political support 
from the WilhelmstraSe t u  this crisis. Worse yet, Germany 
sided with Japan in a League-vote concerning the possible 
participation of non-League countries such as the United 
States in the evaluation of the Manchurian incident. This 
reaffirmed Chinese suspicions of possible German favoritism 
toward Japan. The Foreign Office claimed that this 
coincidental occurrence in no way violated Germany’s policy 
of neutrality in the Far Eat. While Nanking appealed for 
sympathy from Germany, Tokyo pressured her for an early 
recognition of the newly established puppet State, 
Manchukuo(Manchuria). Although this question was thoroughly 
debated in Germany, the Weimar government had no
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intentions of recognizing Manchukuo without League approval. 
However, others such as the National Socialists, called 
for closer political ties with Japan, Japan's powerful 
international status and her dynamic approach to foreign 
policies attracted many Nazi idealists. As Hitler took 
over the chancellorship in January of 1933, the subject 
of rapprochement with Japan became a focal point of 
discussion in German Far Eastern policies.
The year 1933 produced events that were crucial to 
the development in German-Japanese relations. First to 
occur was Japan's withdrawal from the League on March 
27, when the League's committee resolved not to recognize 
Manchukuo(Presseisen,p.25). The League's response was 
expected; the Japanese entourage's sudden departure perhaps 
was not. Now in international isolation, Japan sought more 
than ever, sympathy from previously uncommitted countries. 
Then in October, Germany, dissatisfied with the League's 
armament restrictions, also withdrew from the League of 
Nations. To Japan, this meant Germany was an international 
outcast just like herself and gave Japanese officials an 
added incentive to seek support from Germany, Official 
Germany proceeded cautiously toward Japanese advances 
although Nazi leadership undoubtedly favored an alliance 
with Japan. The Foreign Office warned those seeking to 
recognize Manchukuo of the possible consequences it could
p. 22
bring to the German military and economic relations already
existing in China. Hitler himself, known to have had
sympathy for Japan, agreed that Germany shouldi  not go
"running into the arms" of Japan for two main reasons 2
1 ) Germany was not assured the same economic privileges
in Manchukuo that she may lose in China and 2) Germany
would alienate Great Britain, which viewed a Germany-Japan
alliance as a possible threat to her security. The Foreign
Office added that the move would also isolate Germany from
the other League powers(Fox, p,37). Nevertheless, Hitler
granted certain individuals the use of the
"Fuhrerbetehl"(executive command; Fox, p.26) to pursue
a policy that would accord Germany special trade status
in Manchukuo, even if it meant official recognition of
the State, Within the Wilhelmstrafle, one such individual
was Herbert von Dirksen, the new Ambassador to Tokyo. As
the main official link between Berlin and Tokyo, von
Dirksen (as we shall see) played a substantial role in
developing the German-Japanese friendship. However, of
those interested in bringing Germany closer to Japan in
1933, the most notable was a certain Ferdinand Heye, an 
1 5"adventurer" whose intrepid manners took official Germany 
by surprise.
Ferdinand Heye was a shady businessman who had been 
in Manchuria from 1925-27 and had maintained ostensible
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connections with Manchurian officiais(Weinberg I, p#127)# 
Through contact with German industrialist Fritz Thyssen, 
a well-known supporter of the National Socialists, Heye 
learned of Nazi interest in Manchukuo. Thyssen suggested 
that Heye go see Hermann Goring, who then directed Heye to 
the Foreign Office. Accordingly, Heye approached the 
Foreign Office offering his service as Germany’s 
"plenipotentiary*' for trade negotiations in Manchukuo.
At the time, Germany * s economic interests did include
Manchurian soybeans, but the WilhelmstraSe was not an
optimal place for Heye to start with. Next to the
Reichswehr, the Wilhelmstrafce was the agency most reluctant 
to help improve German-Japanese relations. In any case, 
Wilhelmstrafle officials were not pressed with Heye1s bold 
proposals and advised him against going to Manchuria without 
proper government sanction(Fox, p.28). Supported by Wilhelm 
Keppler, Hitler's economic advisor, the "AuBenpolitisches 
Amt" (APA; a separate foreign affairs organ of the National 
Socialists), and the Fuhrer himself, Heye traveled to 
Manchukuo despite the Foreign Office reprimand.
While in Manchukuo, Heye effected his own political 
demise through his presumptuous behavior. He presented 
Manchukuo officials with details of a State-sponsored 
soybean trade under a government firm and even promised 
recognition of the puppet State. This irritated the 
Wilhelmstrafte, which began to realize the trouble a man
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like Heye could cause. Even Hitler, although clearly 
interested in expanding trade with Manchukuo, was not 
entirely ready to offer recognition. To pre-empt Heye's 
actions, Hitler announced publicly, before Heye's arrival 
in the Far East, that he was not about to grant recognition 
of Manchukuo. The ’’official communique " on the one hand 
pacified the Chinese, who by now had heard rumors of Heye's 
planned activities(Weinberg I, p.128-9). On the other 
hand, it also negated Heye's words before Manchukuo leaders, 
who subsequently rejected his offers. Despite official 
attempts later to make Heye the head of a "private" firm 
for conducting business with Manchukuo, Heye never regained 
his reputation(Weinberg I, p.131). His dream to become 
"consul-general " in Manchukuo evaporated with the incident. 
Soon, even Hitler disclaimed the fallen, self-made 
diplomat. Nevertheless, the significance of Heye's efforts 
is substantial, considering that Germany did indeed conclude
a major soybean trade agreement with the occupied area
in the summer of 1936. Thus, by bringing Manchuria into
the •• triangle'* (Germarty-Japan-China; Presseisen, p.91 ) ,
Heye merely activated the Nazi plans and began the process 
that would phase out China proper from Germany's future 
economic and political strategies.
While Heye stumbled in his plans to become a diplomatic 
hero, von Dirksen did not. Ambassador to Moscow until 
1933, when he was reassigned to Tokyo by Hitler, von Dirksen
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possessed a certain mandate from the Fuhrer which He ye 
lacked. Fox describes him as a “typical representative 
ot the old ruling class, a faithful servant who was also 
inclined to be somewhat anti-Semitic "(Fox, p.24). Von
Dirksen concentrated his efforts on fulfilling Nationalist 
Socialist policies and was one ot the proponents of a 
German-Japanese rapprochement. These qualities made him 
“persona grata witn Hitler"(Fox, p.2rj). Notwithstanding 
his obvious pro-Japanese feelings, von Dirksen was one 
who understood the constraints on German-Japanese relations 
from within the WiIhelmstraBo. Therefore, the Ambassador 
to Tokyo proceeded quite cautiously (which sets him apart 
from the Nazi dogmatists) and tried to stay within the 
'neutral* agenda set by the Foreign office.
Nevertheless, his main objective in the Far Fast was 
for Germany to expand ties with Manchukuo but not 
necessarily at the risk of damaging German ties with China. 
To accomplish this, von Dirksen suggested dispatching an 
"economic mission" to Manchukuo which could investigate 
the possibility of developing the soybean trade, while 
avoiding any sort of "official political commitment" 
(Fox, p.49). In the process, von Dirksen urged the 
Wilhelmstrafie to denounce the work of Heye, who at that 
time was still in Manchukuo, and would be unable to defend 
his actions against his critics. The 'end' for Heye came 
when Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath issued a
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sta*emenf, dated February 4, 1935, proclaiming that Hitler
had wif’hdr<*wn support tor Heye and that the " Commission 
grafted to Herr Heye in February, 1 934## is to be 
W r m  mated "(Pox, p.51). Indeed by then, even Hitler was
convinced that backing Heye was unpopular, and more 
d e t r i M a  1 to his plans than benef icial,
With this political maneuver, the WiIhelmstraBe claimed 
a momentary victory over Nazi forces of the APA 
(Aufienpol itisches Amt or Hitler's Foreign Affairs Office). 
By not expeditiously granting political recognition ct 
Manchukuo, the WiIhelmstrafle was able to maintain tenuous 
control of German Far Eastern policy making. The formidable 
bureaucracy at the Wi 1 nelmstrafte was able to delay 
recognizing the Japanese puppet State until 1936, 
demonstrating indeed that it could, for a while at least, 
hold its own against Nazi power politics. However, this 
show of strength by the WiIhelmstra3e proved to be 
temporary, as it gradually succumbed to the tactics of 
an antagonistic regimei Fox, p.39). Germany's new leader,
Hitler, considered the current Foreign Office to be an 
"Intellectual garbage dump" and began searching for other 
methods to effectuate Party politics and his own intrepid 
foreign policy,
In August of 1932, Hitler met through acquaintances 
a 'gentleman' named Joachim von Ribbentrop, a well-traveled 
liquor salesman who later became Foreign Minister
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(Seabury, p.48) . At the time, von Kibbentrop's apparent 
aptitude in foreign languages (he professed English and 
French skills) caught the Fuhrer's attention. The positive 
impression von Ribbentrop made on Hitler was immediate 
and permanent. Von Ribbentrop1s congenial appearance 
combined with his talent in slavishly "aping"(Seabury, 
p.50) his leader were effective in gaining Hitler's 
confidence. For in 1933, the Fuhrer established the 
"Dienststelle Ribbentrop*', a rump office for his new special 
counsel in foreign affairs. Funded by Hitler's own resources 
(Hitlerspende), the "Dienststelle" became for the 
"Reichskanzler", an appropriate substitute for the extremely 
bureauciatic Wilhelmstrafle. Von Ribbentrop took advantage 
of the favorable treatment from Hitler to ascend in the 
Nazi hierarchy and to implement Party policies, particularly 
with regard to the Far East. How he accomplished the latter 
will be discussed but the former also deserves some 
attention. How von Ribbentrop gained power within the Party 
is, in itself a wonder not only to historical observers 
but to the mainstream Party loyalists at the time. Joseph 
Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, and Hermann Goring among others 
were all 'original1 Nazis who resented the surge made by 
the "upstart" patrician(Seabury, p.49). They were in awe 
over von Ribbentrop1s rise from a personal advisor to Hitler 
to Foreign Minister, all in a span of five years. Who 
was Joachim von Ribbentrop and what were his attributes
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that caused Hitler to be so partial to him, leading to 
his rapid ascendance in the Party ranks? What is the 
background of this careerist who later took the lead in 
Nazi diplomacy, particularly with regard to Japan? In 
order to better understand the scenario of the German 
foreign policy decision making in the mid-1930's, it is 
necessary to present in the following section, a general 
background of the man called Joachim von Ribbentrop.
2.. Profile of Joachim von Ribbentrop
The air of superficiality emanated by "Freiherr*' von 
Ribbentrop, which stirred feelings of contempt among fellow 
colleagues, seemed to have existed from the very beginning 
of his life. Born "Joachim Ribbentrop" (not of noble 
descent, as his name "von" suggests) on April 30, 1893
in Wesel "am Rhein", the son of an army lieutenant grew 
up in "delicate health*' and consequently, was sent to school 
(rather than becoming a soldier like his father). The 
young Joachim studied in London, England and Grenoble, 
France, acquiring his first experiences abroad which later 
proved to be so vital(Seabury, p.46). Before the outbreak 
of WWI, Ribbentrop traveled to Canada, where his affability 
won him various odd jobs and where he eventually began
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his career as a wine distributor. However, he did return
in time to serve in the War and received a distinction
1 7for his effort.
After the War, Ribbentrop claimed to have served as 
an '‘aide-de-camp” in the group representing Germany at 
the Versailles conference. Thereafter, Ribbentrop returned 
to Berlin and flourished as a spirits dealer. Still, 
Ribbentrop was not in the upper echelon of society where 
he had hoped to be. He apparently entered the 'high society' 
later by marrying the daughter of a big time German 
'bhampagne manufacturer*' . By then, Ribbentrop had begun 
his own company, "Schoneberg and Ribbentrop", specializing 
in "French chartreuse, Meukoff brandy, and Johnny Walker 
Scotch whiskey ® Not until 1925, when he was "adopted" 
by a distant relative named Gertrud von Ribbentrop, did 
Joachim also change his name to "von Ribbentrop". The 
dubious circumstances (later his 'adoptive mother' tried 
to blackmail him for the money he 'owed* her for the name 
change) surrounding Ribbentrop*s newly acquired title of 
nobility, later discovered by Nazi counterparts, prompted 
Goebbels to charge, "He bought his name, married his money, 
and thieved his job.” (Feut, p.246)
Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister, was undoubtedly 
von Ribbentrop*s bitterest rival within the Party (which 
the latter did not join until 1932, and even then, he never
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publicly stated that he was a member? Seabury, p.49). 
he had reason to suspect von Ribbentrop's integrity and 
loyalty to the Nazi cause. After all, von Ribbentrop was 
not a supporter of Hitler or Nazi ideals during the early 
uprisings and times of crises. In fact, von Ribbentrop's 
occupation placed him among societal elites, many of whom 
were Jewish(Seabury, p.48). Thus what reason, besides
personal ambitions, did he have to join the National 
Socialists? Von Ribbentrop's evident opportunism and his 
pretentious facade caused the staunch Nazis to absolutely 
loathe him. Representative of the 'mainstream' Nazis was 
Goebbels, who claimed that "every one of the Nazi leaders 
had at least something positive in his character, only 
von Ribbentrop did not" • Others were not much more generous 
with their appraisals of the wine dealer turned politician. 
The Reich's Press Chief Otto Dietrich called him
"spiritless, undiplomatic,...servile" while von Ribbentrop's 
one time State Secretary Baron Gustav von Steengracht 
referred to his superior's "personal hypnotic dependence" 
to Hitler. Even von Ribbentrop's personal secretary, who 
of all the people probably gave the most positive
description of the Foreign Minister, spc'\e of his
"unconditional" obeisance to the Fuhrer(Fest, p.24b).
Vet such was the man, whose "breadth of superficial 
foreign experience "( Seabury, p.50) and aptitude in
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languages had impressed Hitler; someone the Fuhrer needed 
to help carry out his unconventional foreign policies. 
Such was the man who greeted the king of England with a 
Nazi salute(Seabury, p.57) and then wondered why the British 
disdained him. Such was the man who, when asked by the 
Italian Foreign Minister which he wanted, Danzig or the 
corridor, replied M we want war!" Such was the man Hitler 
called a *H3enieM (genius) and a "second Bismarck" (Fest, 
p.245; 252). This was the same man who took control of
the foreign policy in the Far East.
3.The Anti-Comintern Pact
From 1933 to 1935, events occurred that actually 
prevented much improvement in German-Japanese political 
ties. Relations between these two vastly different races 
was, as Dr. Presseisen phrased it, a "confusion"(Presseisen, 
p. 90). The Japanese were troubled by Nazi racial policies 
which barred "mixed marriages " and further persecuted those 
of " non-Aryan " origins by forcing such people to *retire* 
from government office. The Nazis defended their stance, 
stating that theirs was a domestic policy and in no way 
demonstrated disdain for the Japanese. Specifically, State 
Secretary Bernhard von Bulow explained that the Nazis
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were merely trying to maintain racial purity, and that
the racial laws were directea against Jews, Negroes, and
other 'primitive1 races , not against the nigher cultures
1 9(Japanese and Chinese). The Japanese remained skeptical
of these explanations, since the racial laws clearly put
"Aryans" (non-Jewish Germans) above other races; and by
no means were the Japanese seen as "Aryans"(Fox, p.92).
Foreign trade was another issue which widened the diplomatic
gap between Japan and Germany, with the latter claiming
unfair trade practices ("dumping" the cheaper goods in
the other country) by her partner. Finally, military
relations was another source of the growing distrust
between the two countries. Influenced by the pro-Japanese
sentiment of the Nazi regime, the WiIhelmstrafle (the State
Secretary, von Bulow) decided to send Colonel Eugen Ott,
who replaced von Dirksen as Ambassador to Tokyo in 1918,
20to Japan in 1934 to examine her military operations. 
Ott *s mission was rather unsuccessful as were subsequent 
attempts made by the German navy to share i (.formation 
and technology with the Japanese navy. Besides being 
noticeably hostile toward the Germans, the Japanese were 
very reluctant to pass on strategic secrets to their 
European visitors.
Japan's uncooperative nature coupled with the existing 
negative attitude the Reichswehr had towards Japan,
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made the goal of improving military relations between the 
two powers seemingly impossible. Indeed, until 193b, when 
the two nations negotiated the "Anti-Comintern Pact" 
alliance, diplomacy between Japan and Germany was full 
of ambivalence and suspicion. How, then did these two 
competing powers find their ways toward a rapprochement? 
One side had to relent and initiate the peaceful gestures 
toward the other. Surprisingly, it was Nazi Germany, 
a mythically 'brute* and 'powerful* Germany, that ended 
up kowtowing to the Japanese. By zealously pursuing 
political ties with Japan, Germany appeared to be somewhat 
at the mercy of her Far Eastern counterpart than vice versa. 
This allowed Japan to demand that Germany sacrifice much, 
in terms of the latter's interests in China, before she 
would acknowledge Germany's goodwill gestures. On the other 
hand, Germany was willing to compromise her position in 
the Far East in hope of reaping the economic benefits in 
Manchuria (by then, called Manchukuo). Furthermore, 
improved relations with Japan would provide Germany with 
more political clout internationally. However, this 'hope* 
was never realized. As will be shown, befriending Japan 
proved to be a tougher diplomatic challenge than Germany 
had thought.
The main motivation behind the conclusion of the 1936 
"Anti-Comintern Pact" between Japan and Germany was to
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counter the "Comintern*' (Communist International, an
alliance of international communist parties), which had
2 1held its latest congress in August of 19i£j in Moscow.
In it, the Communists spec i f i ca11y had attacked t he current 
German-Japanese cooperation as threatening world peace. 
Certainly, Germany and Japan wanted to secure themselves
from a possible commun ist subversion , considering how much
both hated communism. The 'threat' of communism was a i so
real at that time. Spain at that time was exper ienc i rig
internal unrest due to forces of communism. France was 
also internally besieged. However, 'ltler also considered 
an alliance with Japan useful in that England might then 
be persuaded to align herself with Germany (somehow, Japan 
also wanted England as an ally ; Ft esse i sen, p.107,
96 ) .
Despite recent investigations indicating that apan
might have begun the discussion of the Anti-Comintern
pact, the popular belief remains that it was von
22Ribbentrop*s brainchild. operating from his Hitler funded 
"Dienststelle" von Ribbentrop first contacted the Japanese 
about the possibility of an anti-communist alliance in 
1935. Japanese officialdom was still uncertain of von 
Ribbentrop's status (as they were with Ferdinand Heye)
in the Reich. Strikingly similar to Heye1s title, von
Ribbentrop was, at that time, Hitler's 'Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission'(Fox,
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p.176). Although Heye was struck down by the wrath of 
the WiIhelmstrafle, which still wielded considerable power
in the execution of German foreign policy in 1934, von 
Ribbentrop was not. That is not to say the W i lhelmstraBe 
did not do as much as it could to discredit von Ribbentrop, 
as it did Heye.
What exactly was the role of the Wi Ihelmst rafle during 
mid~19iS when the von R ibbentrap-Oshima talks (involving 
the Anti-Comintern Pact) were just fermenting? Historically, 
it is the Foreign Office or a similar organ of the official 
government (in America, we have the State Department) which 
directs a country's foreign policies. Yet it was the 
"Dienststelle Ribbentrop" that mainly conducted Germany's 
foreign policy vis-a-vis Japan, If the WilhelmstraBe did 
not acknowledge the "Dienststelle's" legitimacy, why did 
it not do more to assert its power over von Ribbentrop 
and his "office"?
Actually, there was little the Foreign Office could 
do besides publicly disavowing von Ribbentrop. The 
WilhelmstraBe was for the most part excluded from the German 
negotiations with Japan. One reason was that Hitler, 
seeing what the office did in contributing tc Heye's 
downfall, realized it could not be relied upon to carry 
out other party policies. Von Neurath, the Foreign Minister 
(head of the Foreign Office) until 1938, was a member of 
the outdated class of diplomats which the Fuhrer disdained.
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Moreover, von Neurath was a visible supporter of Germany’s 
military and economic ties wi* h China and hence, could 
not be trusted to implement any pro-Japanese agendas. The 
Foreign Minister represented the Foreign Office, which 
was still the agency through which ‘official1 nogoLActions 
were carried. Therefore, Hitler had to circumvent the 
Wi Ihelmst ra!3e when it came down to pursuing ideological, 
and hence 'unofficial' ties with Japan. Through his own 
political ingeniousness, Hitler was able to officialize 
an originally unofficial policy. Besides, he was the
Chancellor and was rapidly seizing sole control of power 
within the government.
It was von Ribbentrop who helped Hitler accomplish 
this heist in foreign policy. As Hitler's own right hand 
man , von R i bben t rop wa s an unof f i c ia 1 d i p 1 oma t, d i sc 1 a i tried 
by the Foreign Office (Fox, p.176). Von Ribbentrop's 
clandestine taiks with the Japanese, theoretically 
unwarranted and unofficial, soon became the formal State 
policy. By then, the Japanese did not care about the 
official stance of the Foreign Office but only the mandate
from Hitler.
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4.Intensified Relations With China, 1935-36
While the Nazis via the "Dionstste 1 ie Ribbentrop" 
established friendly relations with Japan, the Reichswehr 
strengthened its commitment to China. The Reichswehr had 
been sanctioning weapons sales to China (with the help 
of the German military advisors in China). In addition, 
the Reichswehr continued to permit ex-army officers to 
serve as advisors to Chiang Kai-shek. Soon it would engage 
itself with a separate Kuomintang government in Canton 
in an effort to attain more raw materials. These mineral 
ores (mostly tungsten and antimony) acquired by the 
Reichswehr played a major part in the German rearmament 
scheme. However, this favorable military policy toward 
China increasingly became a political policy that 
contradicted Party ideology and hence, the Fuhrer's wishes.
Consequently, the dichotomy in Germany's Far Eastern 
Policy became even more visible. The Party's political 
and economic interests in Japan were countered by the Army's 
(Reichswehr's) parallel interests in Japan's 'enemy', China. 
China provided the materials with which Hitler could rebuild 
a strong military nation. Yet tor the Fuhrer, China was, 
as stated before, politically undesirable. For this reason 
and others, Hitler was always hesitant in expressing
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unrestrained support for China. The Reichswehr paid less 
attention to the 'political unattractiveness' of China 
in its dealings with her. To tue Reichswehr, China was
a necessary ally, much like Russia was at one time (though 
Reichswehr officers seemed to have personally favored China 
over the Soviet Union), from whom Germany could obtain 
the necessary materials for a weapons industry. To the 
officers in the Army and War Minister von Blomberg, the
task simply was to rearm, and China was a warehouse of 
raw materials. Therefore, it was imperative that the
Reichswehr maintained favorable ties with China, even it 
this meant sending officials there to act as advisors to 
Chiang. When the Reichswehr was made aware of the 
possibility of attaining ores from the Canton region, it 
was naturally very interested.
The man responsible for arousing Reichswehr interest 
in Canton was a relatively unknown businessman named Hans
Klein. A wel1-traveled entrepreneur (much like his
pro-Japanese predecessor Ferdinand Heye), Klein became 
the source of conflict between the Reichswehr and the 
WilhelmstraBe. The agreement with Canton proposed by Klein 
entailed the basic trade of Chinese raw materials (mineral 
ores) for German military weapons. The Wilhelmstrafce was 
troubled by this intensification of relations between the 
German and Chinese armies. The WilhelmstraBe was fully
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aware that such a deal could possibly damage existing 
relations with the Nanking government since Canton was 
considered a "rival” regime, Nanking was the official 
central government of China with which Germany already 
had substantial economic and military ties. Understandably# 
the Wi Ihelmstrafie did not wish to see such relations 
impaired. This points to the prevailing dilemma within 
the German government concerning the China policy. Not. 
only did the Reichswehr's policy contradict Hitler's 
ever tual goals, but it aiso went against the wish of the 
WilhelmstraBe to remain neutral. Despite Klein’s 
troublesome nature, the WiIhelmstraBe could not discredit 
him as it did Heye since Klein had the clear support of 
top Reichswehr officials.
One of Klein's main backers in the Canton deal was 
Gen. Walt her von Reichenau. Well-known as the ’’Nazi” 
general and as Hitler's "model soldier",24 von Reichenau
was "the only senior general st.aff officer" involved with
the Nazis before 1933. As a result, von Reichenau was
an official most familiar with Hitler and his plan for
26a rapid rearmament which was formulated as early as 1932.
Although he was sympathetic to some concepts of National
Socialism, von Reichenau was by no means a fervent Nazi.
In fact, he was later known to have tried to stem extremist
Nazi views and to have opposed the Fuhrer himself. 27 In
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particular, von Reiehenau did not believe in the advantages
of a German alliance with Japan. While he did not
wholeheartedly support a political alliance with China
either, von Reiehenau (like most Reichswehr officials)
certainly thought that the China trade was worth preserving 
at the expense of a seemingly useless friendship with Japan* 
Ostensibly, Klein also had the support of Gen* von 
Seeckt who was Chief advisor to Chiang until 1934. This 
was important since it implied consent or at least the 
understanding of Chiang Kai-shek himself. So, claiming 
the consent of both the Reichswehr and Chiang, Klein 
approached the German government for recognition and 
financial support. Spec;t ica1ly, Klein needed funds
to back up a revolvinq credit account tor Canton in order 
to facilitate the exchange for goods. Chiang however, 
repeatedly denied giving consent to Klein's project. This 
issue made the Wiihelmstrafle especially sore and reluctant 
to offer official sanction for Mein's activities. 
WilhelmstraBe's warnings to the Reichswehr about possible 
deterioration of existing relations with Nanking led to 
the cancellation of a stipulation of the agreement which 
would have sent Reichswehr officers to Canton. Then an 
attempt was made to secure a similar barter contract with 
Nanking in hope of appeasing the central government. With 
it the Reichswehr hoped to satisfy both governments. Chiang
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never really trusted Klein or the the Canton Regime and 
continued to oppose proposed Reichswehr aid to Canton* 
The situation became so complicated and contused that it 
necessitated a trip by von Reichenau to Nanking to clear 
up any misunderstanding between the two count r ies 
(Fox, p* 135-136).
Eventually, Klein's project received the backing of 
Hjalmar Schacht, the Economics Minister, Georg Thomas of 
the War Ministry's Economics Department, and Hitler also 
(Fox, p,116). The work of Klein and the Reichswehr 
culminated in the "Klein-HAPRO Agreement of April 9, 1916"
which granted the Nanking government RM 100 Million 
revolving credit (Fox, p.lC8).
The HAPRO-Trade agreement also marked the watershed 
in German Far Eastern Policy. Starting in the latter halt 
of 1936, Japanese complaints about German involvement with 
the Chinese became more intense and Nazi policy decisions 
began to shift decidedly in favor of Japan. The Japanese 
had always been aware of German activities (the military 
advisors to Nanking and the weapons for raw materials trade) 
in China but had never forced a decision from the Germans. 
Although the "Anti-Comintern Pact" in November 1936, 
signified a relative commitment on Germany's part to her, 
Japan decided nevertheless to test Germany's loyalty to 
the semi-formal alliance. Specifically, Japan threatened
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to back out of the Pact if Germany did not cease her
indirect support of China• By this, she meant the
withdrawal of the military advisors and the stoppage of 
arms sales to China. Even the pro-China General von 
Reichenau admitted that if Japan were to force Germany 
to choose sides, China could not be helped(Fox, p .140). 
Von Ribbentrop, who in 1 938 had replaced the Chinese-leaning 
von Neurath as Germany1s Foreian Minister, certainly did 
not hesitate to accommodate the Japanese request.
Since 1936, Germany had begun limiting the transactions 
with China but had never breached any of the HAPR ) contracts 
to satisfy Japan. Now the policy would change. The new 
Foreign Minister, who, if you will remember, had told 
Italy's Count Ciano boldly that Germany "wanted war", 
ignored discretion and rationality in moving to sever 
relations with China. He immediately halted deliveries 
of weapons to China, leaving Germany with virtually no 
means of earning foreign exchange (Weinberg II, p. 181). 
Next, von Ribbentrop recalled the military advisors to 
Chiang and eventually threatened those who wished to remain 
in China with expatriation and the loss of property at 
home(Fox, p. 329). Later, this warning was extended to 
all German nationals working in China. Undoubtedly, von 
Ribbentrop was making up for "lost time" in developing 
closer relations with Japan. As Dr. Weinberg observed,
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von Ribbentrop's Hcrude procedure.••liquidated in six 
months, Germany’s position in China5 *11 which had been 
'’carefully, laboriously and successfully built up over 
a period of two decades(Weinberg II, p* 182).M Why such 
a hasty dismantling of a system so rigorously pursued and 
we11-developed? The Nazis feverishly pursued a political 
and military alliance with Japan. In hope of doing it 
quickly, they bowed to the Japanese demands of halting 
support and aid to China, as shall be explained in the 
following pages.
5. Inherent Problems With Si no-German Relations
The favoritism of Party ideology towards Japan was 
only one of several factors that helped dissolve Sino-German
ties in the latter part of the 1 9 30's, a time when the 
Chinese badly needed a dependable ally. Not only did the 
Nazis favor Japan but Hitler felt that Japan played a
necessary part in Germany's power politics; if not in 
enticing England, then intimidating the Soviet Union. 
Japan was by all views an international power, which 
attracted the Nazis.
On the other hand, China occupied a relatively weak
position internationally and hence, was politically
unattractive for the National Socialists. To Hitler and
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von Ribbentrop, China was more likely a liability than
an asset. Moreover, China*s own internal instability
prevented the improvement in official relations with the
Wilhelmstrafie and the Reichswenr. The Foreign Office in
particular did not wish to support one regime at the expense
of losing favor with the other (i.e. Canton and Nanking).
The confusion in China just weakened the regard Germany
had for her. When the Nationalists joined the Communists
in the *'2nd United Front", it only reassured Hitler
that China had been weak and had fallen prey to
international BolshevisnH Presseisen, p.144). This was made
obvious in February, 1938, when Hitler told the Reichstag
(German parliament) that a victory for Japan in China would
be "inf initely less dangerous than a victory for
29Bolshevism." Hitler had clearly chosen Japan. Now the
question was: Had Japan chosen Hitler?
V. CONCLUSION
The abandonment of German interests in China after 
1938 was von Ribbentrop's and Hitler's gesture of goodwill 
to Japan, As one historian noted, "they had done all that 
could reasonably be expected to do for Tokyo" and then 
some(Weinberg II# p,190). Now all Hitler could do is wait 
and see it Japan would respond as he had hoped. Germany 
had already proceeded as Japan had wished by forfeiting 
all their interests in China without "setting any
conditions"(Weinberg II# p.180). The loss of economic power 
in China meant that Germany needed a substitute which would 
provide her the same privileges she had in China. Of 
course# Germany looked to Japan for these economic
privileges. Von Ribbentrop wasted no time in appealing 
to the Japanese Ambassador Togo Shigenori for "equal status" 
or at least "preference status" compared to other countries 
in Manchuria and parts of Northern China under Japanese 
occupation.^  The Japanese though# would not yield to 
the Germans as the Chinese would have. Von Ribbentrop 
and perhaps also Hitler had mistakenly assumed that Japan 
had the same intentions as Germany but such was not the 
case(Weinberg II# p.191)•
On the contrary, Japan never really considered Germany 
as the main object in her foreign policy goals. Japan 
had her own scheme to lure England into a*’ alliance. To
Japan, Germany was also an attractive trump card in playing 
the British hand. Moreover, Japan certainly would not 
give to Germany what she did not even offer the British.
Japan certainly felt r moral obligations to Germany even
after all the latter had done for her.
That Germany was nothinq more than another foreign 
country to Japan (*nd Japan wanted all of them out of
China), was " obvious to everyone but von Ribbentrop," 
Hitler's alter-ego with regards to Par Eastern 
Policlea(Weinberg. 11# p.184). The Nazi Foreign Minister, 
even in the face of official Japanese rejections, sought 
unofficial ways to attain his objectives. He turned to 
his old 'friend* Qshima with whom he had negotiated the 
"Anti-Comintern Pact", in a vain attempt to circumvent 
official channels once again. What he did not know (until 
it was too late) *:as that nothing could change the official 
Japanese position.
Recognizing Japan's refusal to cooperate with his 
wishes, Hitler tried in the last minute (before the War) 
to realign his policies* In August, 1939, Hitle? signed 
a "Non-Aggression Pact" with Runsia, stating that his 
"essoolation with Japan was never popular."(Kirby, p*245)
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Moreover, Japan's recent losses in China had devalued her
worth as a political ally. As for Germany, the liaison
with the Soviets was short-lived as the Fuhrer had
intended. Soon Germany invaded Russia. However, in
November, 1943, Albert Speer, the Armament Minister,
notified Hit 1er of the shortage in the supply of raw
materials, which would be completely depleted within ten
months. In desperation, the German army sought to purchase 
tungsten from China via the "established German firms" 
th^re. Naturally, these firms were gone, obliterated 
by the Nazis as part of the change in Far Eastern Policy,
What would have happened had Germany stayed with her 
interests in China and not bowed to Japan is uncertain. 
However, Germany would have certainly continued receiving 
shipments of mineral ores under HAPKO and foreign exchange 
from the weapon sales to the Chinese. The constant
Sli
ill
replenishing of materials for both sides ("raw” materials 
for Germany and "war" material for China) would undoubtedly 
hav* helped both in their rtruggles. The Chinese on the 
one hand, may have been able to defeat Japan much earlier 
and even eliminated the Communists had they continued 
receiving ammunition from Germany. In addition, the 
assistance provided by the German military leaders would 
have been immeasurable* The Germans, with the continual 
deliveries of tungsten and antimony from China# may have
^  it ; s ',o .v„ i
m:;.
p. 48
been able to extend the War by furthering their conquest 
of Europe, which of course wouLd have been devastating. 
Even so, eventually Germany would have had to deal with 
Americans and then an allied Europe, Therefore, tor China 
and tor Germany, the cessation of relations meant the halt 
on deliveries ot war materials which was costly. 
Considering the events that might have occurred it things
had been j u s t the oppos i te, it is f or t unat e that Germany
did not choose China over Ja pa i \ . Fo r had Germany done
so, she could have possibly prolonged the War and the
horrifying events that came along with it.
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VI. Pie Zusammentassung
Die deutsche Fernostpolit ik der 30er Jahre betraf
hauptsachlich zwei Lander: China und Japan* Line
informelle deutsch-chinesische Beziehung begann bereits 
im Jahre 1928 rait der Ankunft Max Bauers in Kanton, wahrend 
Kontakte mit Japan und dessen f>atel 1 i tenstaat Manehuko
nicht bis nach 1931 aufgenommen wurderi. Ls waren in beiden 
Fallen "Asienexperten", die das otfizielle Interesse der 
deutschen Regierun fur den Fernen Osten erregten.
Der durch den ersten Weltkrieg bei der Heichswehr 
sehr erfahrene, aber politisch nach extrem rechts gerichtete 
Oberst Max Bauer fuhr im December 1927 nach China , um dort 
mit der Nankinger Regierung Gesprache uber die militarische 
Lage zu tuhren* Damals befand sich China seit einigen
Jahren bereits mitten in einem andauernden Burgerkrieg 
zwischen der zentralen Regierung und einheimischen 
Kriegsherren. Oberst Bauer, der gerade zu der Zeit von
der Reichswehr abgelost und damit auch "arbeitslos" war, 
land Gehor bei dem Nankinger Regime, das gerade auch einen 
qualifizierten Militarberater fur Chi.ang Kai-shek suchte. 
Die Chinesen und Bauer haben sich verstanden, und Bauer 
wurde Chiangs erster deutscher Hauptmilitarberater.
An seiner Stelle hat Bauer alles (bis zum Tode) getan, 
was von ihm erwartet werden konnte. Der energische, sehr
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eifrige ehemalige Keichswehroffi/ier zeigte seine 
organisatorischen Gaben, indem er das ganze chinesische 
Heer nach dem deutschen Muster ungestaltete. Dabei muGte 
viel geandert werden. Um die Umstrukturieruny des Militars 
zu erleichtern, wuBte Bauer , daB die Chinesen viele Watfen, 
Kriegsmaterialien, Industrieprodukte, und noch mehrere 
Berater (militarische und zivile) brauchten. Wie er das 
alles schaffen wollte, legte Bauer in mehrei«n Schritten 
dar• Als Bauer dann unvorheryesehen dui< ii cine 
Pockenintektion starb, hatte er bereits die Grundlaye der 
kunftigen deutsch-chinesischen Zusammenarbeit gelegt,
Die Erlolge der deutschen Waftenfirmen und 
industrielien Unternehmen (z,B, der Vereinigten Stuhiwerke) 
in dem Chinahandel wahrend der 30er Jahre sind schlieBlich 
aut die zielbewuflten Planen Hauers zuruckzufuhren, Kurz 
vor seinem Tod hatte der Oberst bereits mehrere deutsche 
Militar- und Zivilexperten anyeworben. Nach Bauers Tod 
ist diese Zahl der deutschen Berater in China noch 
zuyestiegen (teilweise weil Bauer, der den meisten 
Heichswehroi f iziere nicht gut gefiel, schon tot war), 
Beruhmte Generate wie Georg Wetzell, Hans von Seeckt, und 
Alexander von Falkenhausen, wurden nacheinander 
Hauptmilitarberater von Chiang* Sie dienten der Reichswehr 
gleichzeltig als Zwischenhandler. Die deutsche Regierung 
zeigte sich auch weiterhin bereit, mit der zentralen
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Regierung in Nanking offizielle Beziehungen
aufrechtzuerhalten. Bine Gesandtscnaft wurde in Peiping 
(spater Peking) errichtet, ein deutliches Zeichen, daB 
die WilhelmstraBe die Nankinger Regierung offiziell 
anerkannte•
Inzwischen begann Deutschland, inotfizielle Gesprache 
mit Japan tiber einen moglichen anti -kommuni stischen Pakt 
zu fiihren. Fur die Nationalsozialisten bedeuvete Japan 
immer oin politisch sehr wertvolies Land, mit dem sich 
Deutschland verbund^n sollte. Weshaib diese Verhand1 ungen 
mit Japan Minof t iziell " hieBen, ruhrte dahe-r, daB sie von 
den Nazis eingeleitet, und nicht "offiziel" von dem 
Auswartigen Amt sanktioniert wurden. Obwohl Hitler ein
Bundnis mit Japan sehr gerne wollte, wartete er damals
ab und versuchte, nicht seine eigene Machtpolitik rasch
durchzufuhren• Hitler war geduldig und li.eB die
WilhelmstraBe eine Weile noch die AuBenpolitik bestimmen.
Ungefahr bis 1936 besaB das Auswartige Amt noch 
deutlich diese Macht, auflenpolitische Entscheidungen treffen 
zu konnen. Deshalb konnte die WilhelmstraBe noch Ferdinand 
Heye zuruckweisen, als dieser versuchte, die wirtschaftliche 
Politik der Nazis mit Manchuko selbst festzulegen. Heye 
genoB auch nicht die voile Unterstutzung Hitlers und wurde 
deswegen schlieBlich abgelost. Aber die jap&nfreundliche 
Tendenz Hitlers und der Partei liefl sich nicht fur immer
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unterdrucken.
Schon vor der Ablosung Heyes lernte Hitler von 
Ribbentrop kennen. Von Ribbentrop, ein ansehnlicher, 
weltgewandter, und mit Weinhandel beschaftigter Mann 
erwirkte sofort bei Hitler einen guten Eindruck. So konnte 
dieser Karriermacher gleich die Arbeit Heyes ubernehmen 
und in die hochsten politischen Kreise eintreten. Von 
Ribbentrop bewies, ^  er den Fuhrer recht gut naehahmen 
konnte. Bald fiel es vielen ”alten” Nazis wie Goebbels
und Goring aui, daB von Ribbentrop kein ernsthaftiger 
Anhanger der nationalsozialistischen Ideale war. Hitler 
bezweifelte aber nie von Ribbentrops Treue und Ehrlichkeit. 
Der Fuhrer nannte ihn sogar ein ”GenieM*
Die Arbeit von Ribbentrops bestand hauptsachlich darin, 
freundliche Beziehungen mit Japan zu begrunden. Von der 
"Hitlerspende" wurde die "Dienststelle von Ribbentrops” 
unterhalten, die theoretisch unter die Autoritat des 
Auswartigen Amtes kam. Aber Hitler wollte naturlich durch 
die MDienststelle” die WilhelmstraBe umgehen, und seine 
eigene Politik moglichst oft in Kraft setzen. Von 
Ribbentrop hatte keine Schwierigkeiten, Hitlers 
auBenpolitische Ziele im Fernen Osten zu verstehen.
Einige Jahre lang wurden politische Handlungsgesprache 
zwischen Japan und Deutschland gefuhrt, die schlieBlich 
im November 1936 zur Schaffung des ”Anti-Komintern Paktes”
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fuhrten. Dazu gab es einen nicht so bekannten Abschnitt, 
indem beide Staaten deklar ierton, daB sie im Fall eines 
Krieges "neutral" in Bezug auf einander bleiben wurden. 
So entstand das politische Bundnis zwischen den beiden 
Landern Deutschland und Japan, worn it. beide auch hofften, 
den sich ajsdehenden Kommunismus zu behindern und England 
an sich zu binden. Das letzte traf niemals ein.
In den Jahren 1935-36 verstarkte auch die Reichswehr 
ihre Beziehungen mit den mi 1itarischen Regierungen in China, 
eine in Kanton, die andere in it king. Der Gescha11srnann 
Hans Klein, der wie Heye c.uch viel Ertahrung mit dem Fernen 
Osten hatte, wies die Reichswehr auf die Mineralerze in 
Kanton hin. Erze wie Wolfram una Antimon waren notwendige 
Mineralien fur die Waffonherstellung. Unterstutzt von 
den Generalen Walther von Reichenau und von Seeckt und 
am Anfang auch Hitler, eroffnete Klein unter der Firm HAPRO 
(die HandelsgeselIschatt fur Industrielle Produkte) ein 
Konto fur den Umtausch chinesischer Roherze fur deutsche 
Waffen. Obwohl der EinfluB der WilhelmstraBe damals immer 
schwacher wurde, konnte sie trotzdem die 
Reichswehrverhandlungen mit Kanton verhindern, denn die 
WilhelmstraBe konnte Hitler ilberzeugen, daB 
Entwicklungshilfe fur Kanton den guten Beziehungen mit 
Nanking schaden konnte. Also versorgte HAPRO im April 
1936 mit Hilfe des Reichswirtschaftsministeriums nur die
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Nankinger Regierung (und nicht Kanton) mit RM 100 Million 
Kredit. In dem gleichen Jahr wurde in Nanking die deutsche 
Gesandtschaft zu einer Botschaft erhoben. Die 
HAPRO-Vereinbarung kennzeichnete den Hohepunkt der deutsch- 
chinesischen Beziehungen.
Danach wendete sich die Politik des dritten Reiches 
immer mehr Japan zu, Ende 1 936 wurde der "Anti-Komintern 
*'aktM geschlossen. Aber die Japaner fuhlten sich standig 
wegen den immer noch bestehenden deutsch-chinesischen 
Beziehungen beunruhigt, Um diese zu andern, drohten die
Japaner, wenn die Deutschen nicht ganz und gar ihre
Interessen in China aufgaben, den "Pakt" ruckgangig zu
machen. So zwang Japan Dc|utschland, eine wichtige
politische Entscheidung zu trefren.
Fur von Ribbentrop, der bereits 1938 AuBenminister 
wurde, war das wirklich kein Dilemma. Wenn die Japaner 
die Einstellung des deutschen Chinahandels und den Abzug 
der Militarberater aus China wollten, dann bekamen sie 
es, wenn das der Preis emer freundlichen 
deutsch-japanischen Verbindung war. Innerhalb von sechs 
Monaten, nach dem Mandat des neuen AuBenministers, wurden 
die offiziellen Beziehungen, gegen starke Proteste der 
chinesischen Regierung, vollig demontiert. Die deutschen 
Offiziere in China und spater all Deutsche, die dort 
arbeiteten, wurden zuruckberufen. Diejenigen, die in China
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verblieben, wurden ausgeburgert. Am Ende wurde auch die 
deutsche Botschaft, die erst kurzlich in Nanking 
eingerichtet worden war, auch geschlossen. Das 
zwanzigjahrige deutsch-chinesische Verhaltnis wurde 
innerhalb von einem Jahr zerstort zu Gunsten eines nur 
moglicherweise besseren deutsch-japanischen Verhaltrusses. 
Darauf hofften jedenfalls von Ribbentrop und sein Fuhrer, 
aber so kam es nicht.
Nachdem Deutschland alle seine Interessen in China 
freiwillig aufgegeben hatte, hatte Japan einen merklichen 
Vorteil gegenuber Deutschland, Was die Japaner in Nordchina 
und Manchuko beherrschten, war wirtschaftlich sehr wichtig 
und von den Deutschen gewunscht. Die Japaner wu&cer, daft 
die Deutschen irgendwie ein anderes Land anstelle von China 
finden muQten, um ihre Wirtschaft und die Aufrustung zu 
betreiben. Natiirlich verlangte vor Ribbentrop bei Japan 
wirtschaftliche Gleichberechtigung fur deutsche Firmen 
in Manchuko und Nordchina. Die japanische Regierung raumte 
den Deutschen aber nichts ein. Sie hatte andere Plane. 
Japan wollte nie ein endgultiges Bundnis mit Deutschland 
sondern mit England. Aber als sich England nicht mit Japan 
verbunden wollte, erwuchsen daraus auch keine Vorteile 
fur Deutschland, So opfterte Hitler auch die Interessen 
Deutschlands in China fur eine erwunschte Freundschaft 
mit Japan. Am Ende erwarb er nichts.
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Was passiert ware, wenn Hitler bei China geblieben 
ware und die "Chinakarte" gespielt hatte, ist ungewiB und 
nur Spekulation. Was daraus hatte entstehen konnen, ist 
namlich, daB China vielleicht den Krieg mit Japan fruher 
beendet hatte, wenn China weiterhin Waffen und sonstige 
industrielle Produkte von Deutschland bekommen hatte. 
Die andere, dilstere Moglichkeit ist, daB Deutschland den 
zweiten Weltkrieg hatte verlangern konnen, wenn von China 
immer noch Rohmaterialien gekommen waren. Im Hinblick 
darauf ist die Geschichte, wie sie tatsachlich verlaufen 
ist, besser als wenn Hitlers Deutschland die Interessen 
in China welter verfolgt und eine rationale Fernostpolitik 
ausgeubt hatte.
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